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Abstract We present results of an eye-tracking reading study that directly probes
ignorance effects of the superlative numeral modifier at least in embedding and
unembedding environments. We find that interpreting a numeral (phrase) modified
by at least in a context with an ignorant speaker is costlier than in a context with a
knowledgeable speaker, regardless of whether at least is in an embedding environ-
ment or not. In line with online studies testing scalar implicatures using a similar
paradigm, this finding is taken to suggest that the observed processing cost is due to
the derivation of ignorance interpretations via a pragmatic mechanism. Our results,
given the paradigm we employ, further enable us to adjudicate not only between
semantic and pragmatic accounts of ignorance, but also among various pragmatic
proposals, favouring neo-Gricean accounts that derive ignorance as a quantity im-
plicature (Büring 2008; Cummins & Katsos 2010; Schwarz 2013; Kennedy 2015).
We find no evidence indicating that ignorance with at least in interaction with a
universal modal involves an extra operation, like covert movement.
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1 Introduction
Superlative numeral modifiers like at least and at most, as opposed to their com-
parative counterparts more than and less/fewer than, are known to signal speaker
ignorance. For instance, (1) is taken to imply that the speaker is ignorant about the
exact number n of slides Elena’s presentation has. Similarly, (2) suggests that the
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speaker does not know how many children she has, which makes (2) a decidedly odd
utterance.
(1) Elena has prepared at least 40 slides for her presentation.
(2) # I have at least two kids.
Geurts & Nouwen (2007) were the first to point out the epistemic character of
superlative modifiers. They proposed to incorporate this epistemic component into
the lexical semantics. Not long after, however, a series of proposals argued that the
epistemic effects of superlative modifiers were pragmatic rather than semantic in
nature (Büring 2008; Cummins & Katsos 2010; Coppock & Brochhagen 2013b;
Schwarz 2013; Kennedy 2015, a.o.). Roughly, all these accounts take ignorance
to arise as a conversational implicature and they only differ in what the underlying
pragmatic mechanism is that is responsible for the epistemic effect.
If the epistemic effects are indeed inferences based on conversational reasoning,
then it could be expected that they are defeasible. However, ignorance inferences
appear to be hard to cancel:
(3) At least 50 people came to the party yesterday. ??Actually, to be precise,
there were 53 people at the party.
Thus, although the continuation sentence in (3) is not completely illicit, ignorance
inferences seem to do quite bad at what is often thought to be the most common
diagnostic of conversational implicatures. Shedding light on this dubious (seman-
tic/pragmatic) status of ignorance effects of superlative modifiers is one of the
reasons why, more recently, research on numeral modifiers turned to the collection
and study of experimental data. Initially, these experiments probed ignorance effects
by comparing statements with modified numerals to some given definite value,
provided either as the premise in a reasoning task (Geurts & Nouwen 2007; Geurts,
Katsos, Moons & Noordman 2010), as a picture in a truth-value judgment task
(Coppock & Brochhagen 2013a), or as part of a short discourse (Cummins & Katsos
2010; McNabb & Penka 2015). Constrasts in responses between superlative and
comparative conditions are then attributed to the epistemic effect of superlatives.
Coppock & Brochhagen (2013a) show that the contrast found in a reasoning task is
absent in a truth-value judgment task and argue that this is because the ignorance
component is pragmatic in nature. Cummins & Katsos (2010) come to a similar
conclusion by showing that responses in conditions where the context clashes with
the ignorance conveyed by a superlative modifier occupy the middle region of a
Likert scale, while responses to contradictory and congruent conditions are at the
extreme ends of the scale.
None of these experiments directly probed an epistemic component. There are
some recent experiments, however, that do incorporate epistemic information in
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the experimental setup. McNabb & Penka (2015), for instance, manipulate the
speaker’s epistemic state in some of their experimental conditions. The goal of their
experiment is to find out how ignorance inferences are affected by embedding the
superlative quantifier in the scope of a modal. Büring (2008) observed that ignorance
effects are optional in embedding environments, as in (4).
(4) The presentation has to be at least 40 slides long.
On its most salient reading, (4) does not express any ignorance. It simply conveys
that the minimum length of the presentation is 40 slides. However, there is an
epistemic reading as well, which conveys that the speaker does not know the exact
requirement about the number of slides of the presentation, i.e., she is ignorant about
whether the requirement is that n = 40 or that n > 40. This ambiguity is usually
attributed to scope (Büring 2008): ignorance inferences are obviated in the scope of
modals, but can reappear if the modified numeral takes scope over the modal.
In McNabb and Penka’s experiment, participants had to judge whether an utter-
ance with a superlative modifier embedded under a modal (as in (6)) was compatible
with a preceding context that sets up her epistemic state, cf. (5a)/(5b).
(5) a. +knowledgeable speaker: The secretary, who was involved in the selection
process, said:
b. –knowledgeable speaker: The secretary apologized for not knowing the
requirements for the application, and said:
(6) You are { allowed / required } to have { at least / at most } 3 works in the
portfolio you send us.
Strikingly, however, McNabb & Penka (2015) found no differences between the two
contexts. In a different setup, Westera & Brasoveanu (2014) do find a difference
between two kinds of contexts. In their study, consisting of two experiments that each
combined an offline and an online task, they varied the question under discussion
between a precise one (e.g., a how many question) and an imprecise one. They
found that participants are more likely to interpret modified numerals as conveying
ignorance in the precise context. (Strikingly, Westera and Brasoveanu found no
difference in this effect between comparative and superlative modifiers in the overall
analysis of either of their offline tasks.) The online part of their experiment, which
consisted of self-paced reading, showed that in such precise contexts there was a
slowdown at and just after the numeral, compared to the self-paced reading in the
imprecise context. Westera and Brasoveanu take these results to confirm the offline
data, linking the increase in reading times in the precise contexts to the increase of
ignorance readings in these conditions. They attribute the increased reading times
to the costly online calculation of pragmatic ignorance inferences or to the relevant
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silent intonational effects during reading depending on the context. Unfortunately,
a second online task, which contained more clear-cut precise/imprecise contexts,
provided no significant effect whatsoever.
As such, there is so far no conclusive direct evidence of ignorance effects with
modified numerals. The present paper sets out to remedy this. We report on an
eye-tracking reading experiment with a paradigm that has effectively been used in
experimental studies on scalar implicature. The aim of this paper is twofold: i) to
directly measure what happens in real time when interpreting superlative numeral
modifiers in ignorance contexts and gain insight into the nature of ignorance effects,
ii) to detect traces of wide-scope ignorance interpretations of superlative modifiers
in interaction with universal modals.
The next section (Section 2) presents our study, where we also also discuss the
predictions that the existing accounts of ignorance effects with modified numerals
make given our design. Section 3 summarises our findings and concludes.
2 Current study: Insight into the nature of ignorance inferences with at least
The current study was conducted in Dutch and consists of an acceptability pretest
experiment and an eye-tracking reading experiment.
2.1 Design
We aimed to directly measure what happens in real time when interpreting both
unembedded and embedded occurrences of the superlative modifier at least in a
context with a –knowledgeable speaker as opposed to a context with a +knowledge-
able speaker. To this end, we included two manipulations: (i) we manipulated the
speaker’s epistemic state set up by the context preceding the target sentence with at
least in a way similar to that in McNabb & Penka’s (2015) second experiment, i.e.,
+knowledgeable vs. –knowledgeable speaker, see (8a-b), (ii) to test the hypothesis
that ignorance effects for superlative modifiers in embedded positions are due to
wide scope, we manipulated the main verb of the target sentence, i.e., modal (moeten
‘must’ / willen ‘want to’) vs. non-modal (hebben ‘to have’ / zijn ‘to be’), see (9).
(7) Introductory context
Sophie
Sophie
is
is
een
a
kunstschaatsster
figure-skater
en
and
erg
very
fanatiek.
dedicated
Afgelopen
last
weekend
weekend
ging
went
ze
she
proberen
try
zo
as
intensief
intensively
mogelijk
possible
te
to
trainen.
train
‘Sophie is a figure skater and very dedicated. Last weekend she was going to
try to train as intensively as possible.’
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(8) a. +knowledgeable speaker context:
Ik
I
kan
can
je
you
melden
report
hoeveel
how much
omdat
because
ik
I
gisteren
yesterday
met
with
haar
her
gepraat
talked
heb.
have
‘I can tell you how much because I talked to her yesterday.’
b. –knowledgeable speaker context:
Ik
I
weet
know
niet
not
helemaal
completely
zeker
sure
hoeveel
how much
exact,
exactly
maar
but
dit
this
is
is
mijn
my
idee:
idea
‘I’m not sure how much exactly, but this is what I think:’
(9) Target sentence:
Sophie
Sophie
heeft
has
/
/
wilde
wanted
minstens
at least
zeven
seven
uur
hours
op
on
het
the
ijs
ice
geoefend
practiced
/
/
oefenen.
practice
‘Sophie practiced / wanted to practice at least seven hours on the ice.’
As is obvious, a –knowledgeable speaker context like (8b) forces an ignorance
interpretation of the target sentence, which is compatible with the core meaning
of minstens ‘at least’ (n≥ 7 in (9)) and with the relevant ignorance inference (i.e.,
the speaker doesn’t know whether () n = 7 or () n > 7).1 On the other hand,
a +knowledgeable speaker context as in (8a) is compatible with the core meaning
of at least, but at odds with the ignorance inference. This context manipulation
was inspired by Breheny, Katsos & Williams’s (2006) main manipulation in their
self-paced reading experiments on scalar expressions. They measured reading times
of the scalar expressions or and some in a context triggering the relevant scalar
implicature, which was compatible both with the semantics of the scalar and with
the scalar implicature, and in a context that did not trigger that implicature, but was
compatible with the semantics of the scalar. They found longer reading times at
the region of the scalar expression in the implicature-triggering context condition,
which they interpreted as an indication of online scalar implicature generation. A
similar effect was found by Panizza, Chierchia & Clifton (2009), who tested the
interpretation of bare numerals (lower-bounded vs. upper-bounded) with an eye-
tracking reading task with a similar context manipulation: the context that biased an
upper-bounded interpretation (upward entailing context) exhibited a slowdown at
the region of the numeral, which the authors take to suggest that the upper-bounded
1 Note that the speaker in –knowledgeable speaker contexts is set up so as to have partial knowledge of
the n in question rather than total ignorance, cf. I’m not sure how much exactly in (8b). The idea was
to avoid an extremely odd situation of a totally ignorant speaker uttering some number or another.
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interpretation of numerals is due to the computation of a scalar implicature that
happens online and is costly.2
2.2 Predictions
Given the findings discussed in the previous section as well as similar findings
arising from different experimental setups, like those in Bott & Noveck 2004 and
Huang & Snedeker 2009, among others, we assume that an interpretation due to the
derivation of a pragmatic inference arises by taking the context into account, happens
online, and incurs a processing cost. Thus, if ignorance is a pragmatic inference, it
is expected to (only) arise in –knowledgeable speaker contexts and to manifest itself
in a processing penalty on the region of the numeral modifier or of the modified
numeral as a whole. If, in contrast, ignorance is a semantic inference, it should
arise across the board and only cause a slowdown in the +knowledgeability speaker
contexts when hitting the numeral modifier or later due to the resulting contradiction
(i.e., between the speaker’s epistemic state set up by at least and that set up by the
context).
In the next sections, we provide an overview of the predictions the existing
accounts of ignorance yield with respect to both unembedded and embedded oc-
currences of at least given our design and by enriching them with the processing
assumptions we make.
2.2.1 Predictions regarding the speaker’s epistemic state
Büring (2008), Cummins & Katsos (2010), Schwarz (2013) and Kennedy (2015),
who adopt a neo-Gricean account, derive ignorance effects as Quantity implicatures.
According to these accounts, in the –knowledgeable speaker condition that forces an
ignorance interpretation, an ignorance implicature is expected to arise, while no such
implicature should arise in the +knowledgeable speaker condition, which involves a
context that is in conflict with an ignorance interpretation. It is further predicted that
the –knowledgeable speaker contexts will exhibit a slowdown at the region where an
ignorance interpretation is triggered (i.e., main effect of the –knowledgeable speaker
condition).
Coppock & Brochhagen’s (2013b) pragmatic account predicts the same as the
neo-Gricean camp with respect to the –knowledgeability contexts. They propose
an alternative-introducing semantics for at least, or else possibility-introducing
2 The effect in question was found in first-pass measures, e.g., in regression path duration and condi-
tioned regression path duration. As the continuation of the sentence with the bare numeral constituted
an additional manipulation of the experiment affecting second-pass measures, only the results of the
first-pass measures are relevant for us here.
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in the inquisitive semantics framework they adopt, and derive ignorance via the
independently motivated conversational maxim of Interactive Sincerity. In their
account, a speaker that utters at least draws attention to multiple possibilities.
According to their maxim, if a speaker draws attention to multiple possibilities,
it is required that she does not know which of the possibilities in question holds.
Thus, it is also predicted that in the +knowledgeable speaker condition the target
sentence with at least will be incompatible with the preceding context that reveals
that the speaker knows which of the possibilities holds, cf. I can tell you how much
in (8a). If we assume that violating the maxim in question is costlier than obeying
it, a slowdown when reading the modified numeral in the +knowledgeable speaker
condition would further be predicted (i.e., main effect of the +knowledgeable speaker
condition).
Moving to more semantic accounts of ignorance effects, Spychalska (2015),
who makes a distinction between truth- and assertibility conditions, takes ignorance
to be part of the assertibility conditions of superlative modifiers. While, roughly
speaking, at least n is false if the quantity under discussion is smaller than n and
true if it is exactly n or greater, the assertibility conditions for at least n require that
the speaker considers it possible that the quantity in question is n and considers
it possible that it is greater than n. Both the truth- and the assertibility conditions
are met in the –knowledgeability contexts, whereas this is not the case for the
assertibility conditions in the +knowledgeability contexts. The speaker’s epistemic
state as defined by these specific contexts contradicts the speaker’s beliefs as defined
by the assertibility conditions of at least in the target sentence, which always follows
(i.e., main effect of the +knowledgeable speaker condition). Again, similarly to
Coppock & Brochhagen’s (2013b) predictions, if a contradiction of the assertibility
conditions is taxing, a slowdown at the region of the modified numeral is expected
in the +knowledgeability contexts.
Lastly, according to an analysis like that by Geurts & Nouwen (2007), who
assume an epistemic modal component in the truth-conditions of at least to account
for the ignorance implication, the following are predicted: (i) compatibility of the
target sentence with a preceding –knowledgeability context, and (ii) incompatibility
of the target sentence with a preceding +knowledgeability context, because of the
contradiction between the epistemic state of the speaker in that context and the
epistemic state of the speaker signalled by the truth-conditions of at least (main
effect of the +knowledgeable speaker condition). This incompatibility might be
reflected in longer reading times in the –knowledgeability vs. +knowledgeability
contexts. The exact same predictions hold for Nouwen’s (2010) account, which
assumes that unembedded occurrences of at least are licensed by a silent existential
modal operator, which is responsible for the ignorance implication.
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2.2.2 Predictions regarding at least in embedding environments
Most of the above-mentioned accounts derive a wide-scope ignorance interpretation
of at least when it interacts with universal modals (cf. must / want to in target sentence
(9) in modal condition). For instance, an ignorance interpretation would come about
(i) when at least n outscopes the universal modal (Büring 2008; Kennedy 2015),
or, as in Coppock & Brochhagen 2013b, (ii) when at least, which quantifies over
alternatives/possibilities in that framework, is interpreted above the universal modal,
resulting in a speaker’s epistemic state that consists of more than one possibility as
far as the lower bound of the relevant range is concerned, or (iii) when the epistemic
modal quantifier introduced by at least takes scope over a universal deontic modal,
as in the semantic approach in Geurts & Nouwen 2007. Those accounts also derive a
narrow-scope authoritative/+knowledgeability reading, where at least n is interpreted
in the scope of the universal modal, e.g., in the modal version of (9), the speaker
knows the exact desire of Sophie’s, i.e., that Sophie would be satisfied with a 7-
hour-long training and would be satisfied with a 8-hour-long training and . . . with a
9-hour-long training, etc..
In our design, –knowledgeability contexts are expected to favour a wide-scope
ignorance reading of the following target sentence in the modal condition (e.g.,
the speaker does not know the exact desire of Sophie’s, i.e., whether she wanted to
train for 7 hours or whether she wanted to train for 8 hours, etc.), while +knowl-
edgeability contexts are expected to favour the narrow-scope reading (authorita-
tive/+knowledgeability reading) of the target sentence in the modal condition. We
predict that a wide-scope ignorance interpretation of at least will be reflected in
longer reading times at the region of the modified numeral in the embedding en-
vironments preceded by a –knowledgeability context (i.e., an interaction between
the modal condition and the –knowledgeable speaker condition). We base this on
the assumption that covert quantifier movement is costly (Hackl, Koster-Hale &
Varvoutis 2012, but see Jacobson & Gibson 2014; Szabolcsi 2014 for discussion).
2.3 Pretest
2.3.1 Method
We first carried out a pretest to examine the acceptability and coherence of the items
to be used in the eye-tracking experiment. It was created in Ibex and hosted on Ibex
farm (Drummond 2007). Sixteen native speakers of Dutch (11 female, mean age:
29.69, age range: 20–63) filled in the online questionnaire voluntarily.
The pretest questionnaire consisted of two practice items, forty experimental
items, and thirty-two filler items. Each experimental item appeared in four conditions
(± SPEAKER’S KNOWLEDGEABILITY × ± MODAL, cf. (8-9)). Experimental items
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were rotated through lists, so that each participant saw one condition per item. Each
list was randomly assigned to participants.
Participants were given texts like the one composed of (7-9) and had to assess
how compatible the target sentence was with the preceding context. They did so on
a Likert scale from 1 to 7, where 1 stands for “the sentence does not fit the preceding
contex” and 7 for “the sentence fits well the preceding context”.
2.3.2 Results & discussion
As the coherence ratings obtained were ordinal data, we statistically analyse them
with ordered probit models using the ordinal package (Christensen 2015) in
R. The model included two predictors, SPEAKER’S KNOWLEDGEABILITY and
MODAL, each factor of which had two levels, i.e., +KNOWLEDGEABILITY / –
KNOWLEDGEABILITY and +MODAL / –MODAL, respectively. +KNOWLEDGE-
ABILITY and –MODAL were the reference levels. The model also included random
intercepts for participants and items.
Our analysis revealed a highly significant positive main effect of SPEAKER’S
KOWLEDGEABILITY (β = −.726, SE = .121, p < .0001), indicating that partici-
pants judged the target sentence with at least as less compatible with the preceding
context, when that was uttered by a –knowledgeable speaker than when it was uttered
by a +knowledgeable speaker (see relevant scores in boxplot in Figure 1). This was
the case regardless of the type of the main verb used in the target sentence, as no
other effect was found to be significant.
Quite surprisingly, interpreters seem to like at least less in its “natural habitat”
than in a +knowledgeable speaker context. This result brings to mind findings
from the garden path literature, where it has been shown that the taxing processing
operations that take place in garden path sentences make subjects perform poorly
on acceptability judgement or question answering tasks (e.g., MacDonald, Just &
Carpenter 1992). In this light, carrying out an eye-tracking reading experiment would
certainly be in order, to shed light on our intriguing pretest finding and investigate
what exactly causes the problem or what the problem/difficulty exactly is.
Before moving to the presentation of our eye-tracking experiment, we would
like to already evaluate part of the predictions of the theoretical accounts given the
results of the pretest. The higher coherence rates in the case of the –knowledgeability
contexts as opposed to +knowledgeability contexts go against Geurts & Nouwen’s
(2007), Nouwen’s (2010), Coppock & Brochhagen’s (2013b), and Spychalska’s
(2015) accounts. That is, those accounts by virtue of a semantic encoding — in
one way or another — of the epistemic component of at least predict that the
target sentence with at least should be judged as more compatible with a preceding
–knowledgeability context than with a +knowledgeability context.
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Figure 1 Pretest: Boxplot of scores per speaker’s knowledgeability condition.
2.4 Eye-tracking reading experiment
In this section, we present our main experiment that uses the eye-tracking reading
technique. This is a sensitive method of detecting effects and processes that occur
during reading and will help us investigate the real-time interpretation of unembedded
and embedded occurrences of at least in± knowledgeability contexts and also clarify
the effect of –knowledgeability contexts detected in the pretest experiment.
2.4.1 Participants
Forty native speakers of Dutch participated in the eye-tracking experiment (28
female, mean age: 24.23, age range: 18–65), who where recruited from the UiL OTS
participant database.3 They received 7.5 euro for their participation. All participants
had normal or corrected to normal vision and were naive as to the purpose of the
study.
3 Three participants were excluded early on, as two of them turned out to have participated in our
pretest and the third was falling asleep during the experiment.
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2.4.2 Materials
Of the forty test items included in the pretest, thirty-two of them were tested in
the experiment, as eight items with the lowest acceptability mean scores overall
were excluded. Participants saw 128 trials in total: four practice items, thirty-two
test items, and ninety-two filler items. The latter constituted the test items of two
separate experiments. Sixty-eight comprehension questions were included too, to
control for whether participants pay attention to the texts they are reading. Of the
experimental items eighteen had a comprehension question, while the remaining fifty
comprehension questions were follow-ups of the filler items. The target sentence in
twenty-five of the test items like that composed of (7-9) was not the last sentence of
the text, but was followed by another sentence (e.g., (9) was followed by She has
been busy for weeks with a very difficult new exercise).
As in the pretest, each experimental item appeared in four conditions (± SPEAK-
ER’S KNOWLEDGEABILITY ×± MODAL). Experimental items were rotated through
four lists, so that each participant only saw one condition per item. Every partici-
pant saw only one list and the trials of every list were randomly ordered for each
participant.
Experimental items extended on five to eight lines and filler items between one
and eight lines. Every line included up to sixty-eight characters (including spaces).
The target sentence most of the time was kept on one single line, unless it was more
than 68 characters long, in which case a line break occurred after at least two words
after the numeral modifier. (±) Knowledgeability context sentences appeared in one
or two lines.
2.4.3 Procedure
Participants were seated in a comfortable chair and the distance of their head to the
screen was 55–70 cm. Their eye movements were recored by an EyeLink 1000 in
remote mode (using a target sticker), sampling at 500Hz. The stimuli were presented
on a 17-inch Acer AL1717 monitor and a three-button button box was also provided
to participants for answering the comprehension questions or moving on.
Participants first read the instructions, where they were informed that they would
be presented with short stories, each consisting in a short paragraph. After the story,
a comprehension question about the text just presented would occasionally appear,
which they had to answer by using the button box (right button for YES and left
button for NO). The third, middle button could be used to go to the next page. After
reading the instructions, the calibration procedure with nine fixation points would
start. After that, participants would move on to the practice block, where they read
four practice items and answered comprehension questions that two of them were
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Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 Region 5 Region 6 Region 7
Sophie
{
has
wanted to
}
at least seven hours on the ice
{
practiced
practice
}
Table 1 Eye-tracking experiment: Regions of target sentence.
associated with. Then the experiment block began. Before the presentation of a
stimulus, a fixation point would appear to mark the beginning of the text, in order to
help participants find the start of the first sentence and avoid a seeking behaviour that
can influence the reading data. Participants were instructed to read at a normal pace,
as they would do in their everyday life. The whole experiment lasted approximately
40 minutes.
2.4.4 Results
Subjects answered correctly 87% of the comprehension questions on average and
no subject scored lower than 75%. All participants were included in the statistical
analyses. Data of two items that contained a typo were excluded from the analyses.
These two items were not excluded altogether though, as the typos were noticed
early on and were corrected for the most part of the experiment.
The relevant parts of the texts for our manipulations, that is, starting from the
speaker’s knowledgeability sentence up to the end of the target sentence, were split
into regions for the purpose of the analyses. The knowledgeability context sentence
as a whole made up Region 1, while the target sentence was broken down into
smaller regions as illustrated in Table 1 for (9).4 For each of those regions we
analysed the following seven reading time measures: (i) first pass (i.e., all fixations
in a region before exited to any direction), (ii) right bounded (i.e., all fixations in
a region before exited to the right), (iii) regression path duration (i.e., all fixations
since the first fixation in a region until it is exited to the right), (iv) probability
of regression, (v) total reading time (i.e., all fixations in a region), (vi) re-reading
time (i.e., all fixations in a region excl. first-pass fixations), and (vii) probability of
re-reading.
We conducted mixed-effects linear regression analyses for the log-transformed
reading-time data and mixed-effects logistic regression analyses for the categori-
cal regression probability and re-reading probability measures, by using the lme4
package in R. All analyses included two predictors, SPEAKER’S KNOWLEDGEABIL-
ITY (+KNOWLEDGEABILITY vs. –KNOWLEDGEABILITY) and MODAL (+MODAL
4 The numeral was grouped together with the noun (Region 5) to comply with the predominant syntactic
structure of modified numeral phrases in the literature (Krifka 1999; Geurts & Nouwen 2007).
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vs. –MODAL), with +KNOWLEDGEABILITY and –MODAL as the reference levels,
respectively. The analyses also included random intercepts for both subjects and
items. Finally, observations with residuals over ±2 were removed from the analyses.
Under a neo-Gricean pragmatic analysis in which ignorance inferences are im-
plicatures (Büring 2008; Cummins & Katsos 2010; Schwarz 2013; Kennedy 2015)
that have to be computed online and are costly, parallel to scalar implicatures, a
positive main effect of SPEAKER’S KNOWLEDGEABILITY is expected. At the other
extreme, a clearly semantic account of ignorance, such as Geurts & Nouwen’s (2007)
and Nouwen’s (2010), would be in line with a negative main effect of SPEAKER’S
KNOWLEDGEABILITY. The same could hold for hybrid accounts that include a
different maxim or condition on the use of at least (Coppock & Brochhagen 2013b;
Spychalska 2015), assuming that the violation of such a condition would be costly.
The statistical analyses revealed a positive main effect of SPEAKER’S KNOWLEDGE-
ABILITY in Region 5 (“seven hours”), which was significant in total reading times
(β = .055, SE = .024, p = .033) (see Figure 2), and marginal in re-reading prob-
ability (β = .347, SE = .177, p = .050) and in first-pass reading times (β = .043,
SE = .025, p= .092). Note that this region is where the interpretation of the whole
modified numeral is completed. For this reason, Region 6 (“on the ice”) constitutes
a spillover region. A positive main effect of SPEAKER’S KNOWLEDGEABILITY
was further found in that spillover region in re-reading time (β = .166, SE = .054,
p= .005). These effects are in line with a neo-Gricean account of ignorance effects
of superlative modifiers that derives them by exploiting the maxim of Quantity.
Furthermore, according to an account of ignorance effects with an embedded
occurrence of at least, whereby ignorance is the result of a wide-scope movement of
at least with respect to the present universal modal operator (Geurts & Nouwen 2007;
Büring 2008; Coppock & Brochhagen 2013b; Kennedy 2015) and that operation is
costly, as has been shown for other types of covert movement, a positive interaction
effect is expected at at least or at spillover regions. No such effect was found, or any
other interaction effect whatsoever.
Finally, we found a positive main effect of MODAL in Region 3 (“has/wanted
to”) up to Region 6 (“on the ice”) in various first-pass and second-pass measures
(all p < .05) as well as in Region 2 (“Sophie”) in re-reading probability (β = .378,
SE = .173, p= .029). This effect became negative in the very last region (Region
7: “practiced/practice”) in right-bounded and total reading times (β =−.063, SE =
.028, p= .033, and β =−.071, SE = .029, p= .022, respectively).
2.4.5 Discussion
To start with the least interesting findings as to the purpose of the present study, the
effects of MODAL, manifested throughout the target sentence, could most probably be
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Figure 2 Eye-tracking experiment: Mean log-transformed total reading times (log
RTs) and standard errors (SEs) for the regions of the target sentence.
attributed to the different verbal material in Region 3 (“has/wanted to”) and Region
7 (“practiced/practice”), and the various aspects that make those verbs differ, e.g.,
length, frequency, tense, semantics, etc.. Next, the absence of an interaction effect,
leads us to conclude that we found no evidence indicating that ignorance triggered
by the interaction of at least with a universal modal involves an extra process, such
as covert movement (wide-scope ignorance). Finally, and most importantly, it seems
that the online findings come to confirm our offline data and to show us where
exactly the unacceptability for –knowledgeability contexts in the pretest comes from:
the region of the modified numeral phrase and the first spillover region cause people
difficulties and make them spend more time or re-read those regions. This result lends
support to a pragmatic account where ignorance is derived as a scalar implicature and
is costly, and is obviously against an account that takes ignorance to be a semantic
inference, predicting a similar penalty, though in the +knowledgeability contexts,
due to the arising contradiction.
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However, there is an alternative explanation of the SPEAKER’S KNOWLEDGE-
ABILITY effects we found. Although we used both low (e.g., two, seven, fifteen) and
higher (e.g., sixty-four, four hundred or hundred thirty millions) numbers in our tar-
get sentences, we did not systematically control for the roundness or the preciseness
of the number. One could expect that the use of at least would be incompatible or
less acceptable with a non-round or precise number in –knowledgeability contexts,
as it would be weird for an ignorant speaker (with partial knowledge of the number
at stake) to utter such a number with at least. Hence, the effects in the numeral
or the next region could be because subjects did not expect that material there or
found its use unnatural. In the next section, we report on two additional analyses we
performed to investigate the possibility that the SPEAKER’S KNOWLEDGEABILITY
effects were confounded by the roundness or the preciseness of the numbers used.
2.4.6 Subsequent analyses
In these analyses, we considered two notions of roundness: one that only takes the
number into account and one that considers the preciseness of the number given
the granularity level set by the noun, e.g., cf. to lose at least 2.3 kg vs. to lose at
least 2.5 kg, where in the former the number involves a finer granularity and is more
precise/unround compared to the latter.
In the first analysis, the notion of roundness was based on Jansen & Pollmann’s
(2001) definition. Jansen & Pollmann tested in a corpus study in Dutch which num-
bers appear in approximation contexts following the word ongeveer “approximately”.
Based on their findings, they concluded that a number is round if it belongs to the
range 2–9 or if it is divisible by powers of 2, 5 or 10. Given this definition, nineteen
of our items contained a round number. ROUNDNESS was added to the model as
a predictor, besides SPEAKER’S KNOWLEDGEABILITY and MODAL. +ROUND-
NESS, +KNOWLEDGEABILITY and –MODAL were the reference levels. A positive
effect of SPEAKER’S KNOWLEDGEABILITY was found in Region 5 (“seven hours”),
which was significant in total reading times (β = .054, SE = .024, p = .037) and
marginally significant in first-pass reading times (β = .046, SE = .025, p= .075).
Moreover, a positive effect of SPEAKER’S KNOWLEDGEABILITY was attested in
the spillover Region 6 (“on the ice”) in re-reading times (β = .232, SE = .071,
p = .003). ROUNDNESS was further found to be significant in Region 5 in vari-
ous measures (first pass: β = .446, SE = .113, p < .001, right-bounded: β = .471,
SE = .125, p =< .001, regression path duration: β = .490, SE = .129, p < .001,
total reading time: β = .433, SE = .122, p = .002, re-reading time: β = .379,
SE = .126, p < .001).
In our second analysis, where the second notion of roundness was employed,
fifteen of our items turned out to involve a round number. Again, ROUNDNESS
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was added to the model as a predictor and the reference levels were +ROUNDNESS,
+KNOWLEDGEABILITY and –MODAL. The analysis revealed a positive main effect
of SPEAKER’S KNOWLEDGEABILITY in Region 5 (“seven hours”) in first-pass and
total reading times (β = .078, SE = .036, p = .039, and β = .055, SE = .024,
p= .033, respectively), as well as in spillover Region 6 (“on the ice”) in re-reading
times (β = .248, SE = .078, p= .004). No effects of ROUNDNESS were found.
The new analyses show that the SPEAKER’S KNOWLEDGEABILITY effects
attested in the main analyses persist, even when (either notion of) roundness is
taken into account. In other words, comprehenders still slow down on a round or
imprecise number and the region that follows it when the sentence is uttered by a
–knowledgeable vs. a +knowledgeable speaker. Thus, it seems that the roundness
of the numbers used in our experiment was not a confounding factor and we can
still take our findings to support a scalar implicature status of ignorance with at
least whose calculation incurs a processing cost, similarly to run-of the-mill quantity
implicatures.
3 Conclusion
Aiming to obtain and provide conclusive direct evidence of ignorance effects with
numeral modifiers, we investigated how the superlative numeral modifier at least
is interpreted in –knowledgeable speaker contexts as opposed to +knowledgeable
speaker contexts by means of a paradigm that has successfully been used in the
experimental research on scalar implicature. We considered both unembedded
and embedded occurrences of at least when uttered by a +knowledgeable or a
–knowledgeable speaker. Employing such a setup and examining what happens
in real-time processing of the resulting discourses, further allow us to evaluate
the predictions that existing theoretical accounts of ignorance give rise to and
differentiate between the various proposals.
We found that comprehenders like an utterance with at least more when this
follows a +knowledgeable speaker context than when it follows a –knowledgeable
speaker context, regardless of whether at least appears in the scope of a universal
modal or does not. This first finding already invalidates the accounts that assume
a clear semantic status for the epistemic effects of superlative modifiers (Geurts
& Nouwen 2007; Nouwen 2010) or that pose a maxim/condition on the use of
superlative modifiers, requiring that, when a speaker utters them, she has to enter-
tain more than one possibility and should not know which one holds (Coppock &
Brochhagen 2013b; Spychalska 2015).5 All those accounts predict that a sentence
with a superlative modifier would be contradictory or infelicitous when uttered by
5 Note that the term possibility is used differently in each of these two accounts.
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a +knowledgeable speaker, contrary to what the pretest revealed. The eye-tracking
reading measures in turn enabled us to pinpoint what has most probably caused
comprehenders’ dislike of the –knowledgeable speaker condition in the acceptability
pretest. We found that the region where the interpretation of the whole modified
numeral is completed as well as the one just after cause difficulties to the interpreters
and make them slow down in –knowledgeable speaker contexts. After having ex-
cluded potential confounding effects of the unroundness of the numbers used in the
experimental items, we take the processing cost incurred in these specific regions
to be associated with the derivation of an ignorance implicature, similarly to the
interpretation of similar findings by studies on scalar implicatures using the same
paradigm (Breheny et al. 2006; Panizza et al. 2009). Our online finding is in line
with the neo-Gricean pragmatic accounts that derive ignorance as a scalar implica-
ture, but again at odds with Geurts & Nouwen (2007); Nouwen (2010); Coppock
& Brochhagen (2013b); Spychalska (2015), who would predict the opposite effect,
assuming that the contradiction between the speaker’s epistemic state as encoded in
the semantics of at least or signalled by its use and of that revealed by the +knowl-
edgeability contexts would cause extra processing cost. As to the secondary goal of
our study, we found no evidence that the ignorance reading that arises when at least
is embedded under a universal modal is due to the wide-scope movement of at least.
Although the offline findings offered up until now by Geurts & Nouwen (2007),
Cummins & Katsos (2010), Geurts et al. (2010), Coppock & Brochhagen (2013a),
McNabb & Penka (2015) suggest that ignorance effects are pragmatic in nature
and, thus, help us adjudicate between semantic and pragmatic accounts of igno-
rance, a more direct as well as online investigation enables us to distinguish even
further between the various accounts and exclude certain pragmatic proposals whose
predictions are not borne out. More importantly, our study can be viewed as pro-
viding additional evidence in favour of the claim that the computation of pragmatic
inferences by means of the standard neo-Gricean recipe happens online and is costly.
As an outlook for future investigation, it would be interesting to also test com-
parative modifiers using the same paradigm and even material, and contrast them
with superlative modifiers. As is evident from (8a-b), the question under discussion
in our experimental items is a precise one (cf. I can tell you how much / I’m not sure
how much exactly) and according to Westera & Brasoveanu’s (2014) predictions
and findings no difference between the two types of numeral modifiers is expected
in the ignorance-triggering condition (–knowledgeable speaker contexts). On the
other hand, according to a well-established claim in the modified numeral literature,
ignorance should (more strongly) arise with superlative modifiers and a processing
difference should be observed between the two types of numeral modifiers in the
ignorance-triggering condition.
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